来源:管理科学与工程系
主 题:社会责任定价
主讲人:陈虹桥(南京大学工程管理学院副教授)
协调人:刘靓晨
时 间:6月5日 (周四) 上午10:00
地 点:明德商学楼706室
语 言:中/英文
讲座摘要:
When a firm sets a price for its product and sells to a market of customers with heterogeneous private valuations, the price divides the total pie of the social welfare into the firm's profit and consumer surplus. We examine and compare three commonly used socially responsible pricing schemes that may divide the pie differently. Specifically, the socially responsible (S) scheme maximizes the convex combination of the firm's profit and social welfare, with the weight on the latter referred to as the corporate social responsibility (CSR) level, equivalent to maximizing the firm's profit plus the CSR level times consumer surplus. The Nash bargaining (B) scheme follows the notion of proportional fairness, with the weight on consumer surplus being the given CSR level. The Rawlsian fairness (R) scheme generalizes the max-min fairness notion and aims to generate consumer surplus to be a fraction of the social welfare at the CSR level. We show that for any scheme, the firm's sacrifice in its profit always leads to a greater increase in consumer surplus, which suggests that a little CSR can go a long way. For any given customer valuation distribution and CSR level, we show that scheme B leads to a lower price than schemes S and R, generating more consumer surplus and social welfare. Moreover, when the firm has to commit to a scheme before knowing the valuation distribution, for the same CSR level, scheme S is robustly preferred from the firm's profit perspective because it leads to higher worst-case and best-case profit bounds than schemes B and R that somewhat surprisingly share the same lower and upper profit bounds. Nevertheless, scheme B is robustly preferred from the consumer surplus and social welfare perspectives.
主讲人简介:
陈虹桥,南京大学工程管理学院副教授,博士毕业于中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院,期间受国家留学基金委资助赴多伦多大学Rotman管理学院联合培养。研究方向包括收益管理、排队博弈、供应链管理等。以第一/通讯作者身份在Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Production and Operations Management、Naval Research Logistics等知名学术期刊上发表多篇学术论文。获2023年度M&SOM最佳论文提名奖、第四届全国供应链与运营管理学术年会最佳论文三等奖、第十五届行为运筹学与行为运营管理国际研讨会青年教师优秀论文奖、首届江苏省运筹学会青年科技奖。
人大商学院新闻网版权与免责声明:
① 凡本网未注明其他出处的作品,版权均属于人大商学院,未经本网授权不得转载、摘编或利用其它方式使用上述作品。已经本网授权使用作品的,应在授权范围内使用,并注明“来源:人大商学院”。违反上述声明者,本网将追究其相关责任。
② 凡本网注明其他来源的作品,均转载自其它媒体,转载目的在于传递更多信息,并不代表本网对其负责。
③ 有关作品内容、版权和其它问题请与本网联系。
※ 联系方式:中国人民大学商学院宣传信息事务办公室 邮箱:media@rmbs.ruc.edu.cn